Duty, Foreseeability, and Montemayor v. Sebright Products, Inc. by Steenson, Michael
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal
of Public Policy and Practice
Volume 39 Article 2
2018
Duty, Foreseeability, and Montemayor v. Sebright
Products, Inc.
Mike Steenson
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, mike.steenson@mitchellhamline.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice
Part of the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice by
an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more
information, please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Steenson, Mike (2018) "Duty, Foreseeability, and Montemayor v. Sebright Products, Inc.," Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy
and Practice: Vol. 39 , Article 2.
Available at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol39/iss1/2
MITCHELL HAMLINE 
LAW JOURNAL OF 
PUBLIC POLICY AND PRACTICE 
VOLUME 39  SPRING 2018 
© 2018 by Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice 
 31 
DUTY, FORESEEABILITY, AND 
MONTEMAYOR V. SEBRIGHT PRODUCTS, INC. 
Mike Steenson* 
1.  THE MAJORITY—THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ............................................. 33 
2.  THE DISSENT—THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ................................................. 41 
3.  CLOSE CASES ............................................................................................... 44 
4.  SHOULD THE JURY BE INSTRUCTED ON FORESEEABILITY? ....................... 47 
5.  SHOULD FORESEEABILITY EVEN BE PART OF THE DUTY DETERMINATION?
 .................................................................................................................... 49 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 52 
APPENDIX   THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT METER.............................................. 53 
 
In Montemayor v. Sebright Products, Inc.,1 a perfect storm of 
events led to the plaintiff’s devastating injuries and the lawsuit 
before the court. The plaintiff, a laborer for VZ Hogs, a family-
owned company that raises hogs and produces hog feed, was 
seriously injured while attempting to manually relieve a jam in an 
extruder manufactured by Sebright Products, Inc.2 The extruder was 
used to crush food containers with a hydraulic ram.3 The liquid from 
the containers was siphoned off and a hydraulically powered press 
(plenum) crushed the containers and pushed them out of through a 
discharge chute and into a separate compacting machine. 4 
Montemayor was in the machine with another employee, attempting 
to relieve a jam, when a co-employee, unaware Montemayor was in 
the machine, activated it in an attempt to relieve the jam.5 That 
                                                 
* Bell Distinguished Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 
1. 898 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2017). 
2. Id. at 625. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 626. 
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caused the plenum to descend on Montemayor’s legs, crushing 
them. Both legs had to be amputated above the knee.6 
Montemayor sued Sebright, alleging that the design of the 
extruder was defective and that the warnings on the machine were 
inadequate. 7  The district court granted Sebright’s motion for 
summary judgment, concluding that the injury to Montemayor was 
not foreseeable.8  The court of appeals affirmed.9 
On appeal, the supreme court reversed in a four-three decision. 
Justice McKeig, writing for the court, framed the case: 
In this case, two long-established rules come together. First, in a 
negligence case, when the issue of reasonable foreseeability of the 
injury is close, it should be decided by the jury. Second, on a motion 
for summary judgment, all facts and the inferences arising from them 
must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party.10 
In a split decision, the supreme court reversed the court of 
appeals. Taking “the evidence and inferences in the light most 
favorable to Montemayor,” the court concluded that “reasonable 
persons might differ as to the foreseeability of Montemayor’s 
injury,” making it “a ‘close case’ in which foreseeability must be 
resolved by the jury.” 11  Three justices dissented from that 
conclusion.12 
Montemayor is yet another in a long line of Minnesota cases 
dealing with the issue of foreseeability in tort law.13 The key issue 
concerned whether Sebright owed a duty to Montemayor. 14 
                                                 
6. Id. at 627. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 625. 
9. Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., No. A15–1188, 2016 WL 1175089 
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2016). 
10. 898 N.W.2d at 625. 
11. Id. 
12. Chief Justice Gildea dissented, joined by Justices Anderson and Stras. Id. at 
633–34, 642. 
13. See Mike Steenson, The Domagala Dilemma—Domagala v. Rolland, 39 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 633 (2013); Mike Steenson, Minnesota Negligence Law 
and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harms, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1055 (2011). 
14. The foreseeability issue may also arise in the court’s consideration of the 
breach and proximate cause issues as well, which further complicates the analysis 
of torts cases. 
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The rough framework for evaluating the duty issue in 
negligence cases is relatively clear, at least insofar as the cases 
generally require a foreseeable risk of injury to a foreseeable 
plaintiff before a duty will be imposed on a defendant. 15   The 
variance in foreseeability standards and in the application of those 
standards in cases involving summary judgment motions to dismiss 
for lack of foreseeability, complicates development of an even-
handed approach to the issue, however. It does seem to be clear that 
in “close cases” the foreseeability issue will be for the jury. As 
Montemayor illustrates, there is some disagreement about what it 
takes for that tag to apply. 
Montemayor might be read as just one more example in the 
“close cases” line of decisions, or, read more broadly, it might be 
seen as an adjustment of the judge-jury relationship that perhaps 
portends a softening of the summary judgment hammer that often 
precludes resolution of the foreseeability issue by the trier of fact. 
This essay examines that issue in detail. The first part analyzes 
the legal framework of the majority. The second does the same with 
the dissenting opinion. Part three focuses on the “close cases” 
rubric. The court’s recent decision in Senogles v. Carlson 16  is 
introduced in that discussion. That case is important to the analysis 
because, although it involved the duty of a landowner, the court split 
along the same lines as it did in Montemayor, with the majority 
concluding that the foreseeability of harm to an injured child was a 
jury issue. The fourth part considers the question of whether a jury 
should be specifically instructed on the foreseeability issue and if 
so, what such an instruction might look like. Part five considers the 
question of whether foreseeability should be part of the duty 
determination. Part six is the conclusion. 
1.   THE MAJORITY—THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The majority’s analytical path for analyzing the foreseeability 
issue was standard. 
                                                 
15 . Doe 169 v. Brandon, 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. 2014), quoting 
Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 23 (Minn. 2011), quoting 1 J.D. LEE & 
BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY & LITIGATION § 3.48 (2d 
ed.2003). 
16. No. A15-2039, 2017 WL 4273816 (Minn. 2017). 
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• In products liability cases design and warning theories are 
separate, but in both cases duty turns on foreseeability of 
injury.17 
• Duty is generally a legal question for the court, but if there 
is a specific factual dispute over a manufacturer’s awareness 
of a risk of injury, the foreseeability issue is for the jury.18 
• The test for foreseeability is whether, given the defendant’s 
conduct, “it was objectively reasonable to expect the 
specific danger causing the plaintiff’s injury.”19  
• To determine foreseeability, “we look to the defendant’s 
conduct and ask whether it was objectively reasonable to 
expect the specific danger causing the plaintiff’s injury.”20 
• There is no duty in cases where as a matter of public policy 
the connection between the alleged negligent act and the 
injury is too remote to impose liability.21 
• “‘[T]he precise nature and manner’ of the injury does not 
have to be foreseeable; rather the issue is “whether ‘the 
possibility of an accident was clear to the person of ordinary 
prudence.’”22 
• “[A]s a matter of law . . . an injury is not reasonably 
foreseeable when the ‘undisputed facts, considered 
together,’ establish that the connection between the 
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury was ‘too 
attenuated.’”23 
                                                 
17. Montemayor v. Sebright Products, 989 N.W.2d 623, 629 (Minn. 2017) 
(citing Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 26 (Minn. 2011)). 
18. Id. at 629 (citing Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 
467 (Minn. 1988)). 
19. Id. at 629 (quoting Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 27 (Minn. 2011)). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 629 (quoting Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 27). 
22. Id. at 629 (quoting Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 27). 
23 . Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 629 (quoting Doe 169 v. Brandon, 845 
N.W.2d 174, 179 (Minn. 2014)). 
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• If “‘reasonable persons might differ as to whether the 
evidence’ establishes that the injury was foreseeable,”24 the 
court has “consistently submitted the issue to the jury.”25 
• “[I]t is well established that manufacturers can be held liable 
despite intervening circumstances—such as an employer’s 
comparative negligence, a plaintiff’s failure to heed 
warnings, and the disabling of safety devices—if such 
circumstances were also foreseeable.”26 
The key issue in the case concerned the obligation of the 
manufacturer to anticipate the employer’s errors that led to the 
assessment of $18,000 in fines for MNOSHA violations. 27  The 
violations included improper training in the safe operation of the 
equipment involved in the accident; failing to lock out the extruder 
prior to attempts by employees to clear the jam, even though the 
employer had a written lock out program; and failure of the operator 
to verify that all employees were clear of the machine before 
starting it.28 
In addressing the foreseeability of injury notwithstanding VZ 
Hogs’ intervening conduct, the court relied on a trilogy of cases it 
perceived to be sufficiently equivalent to justify denying the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment:  Parks v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp.,29 Bursch v. Beardsley & Piper,30 and Bilotta v. 
Kelley Co.31 
The court placed primary reliance on its opinion in Parks, which 
it found to be “strikingly similar on the facts.”32  The plaintiff in that 
case was injured while in the process of attempting to unclog a jam 
                                                 
24. Id. at 630 (citing Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2007)); 
see also Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630, 636–37 (Minn. 
1978). 
25. Id. 
26. Montemayor, 989 N.W.2d at 630 (citing Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. 
Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. 1986)). 
27. Id. at 627. 
28. Id. 
29. 289 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. 1979). 
30. 971 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1992). 
31. 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984). 
32. Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 630. 
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caused by corn stalks in his father’s forage harvester.33 The supreme 
court held that the defendant could have anticipated that machine 
users would manually unclog the machine because it did not provide 
a mechanical means of unclogging it; that it could also foresee that 
the machine would be unclogged while the power was connected; 
and that it would involve an operator handling corn stalks close to 
whirling feed rolls, which were accessible through a chute door 
which could be opened with the power on due to the absence of a 
safety lock interlock  device that would have prevented the door 
from opening while the power was on.34  The court concluded that 
“[t]he jury could find that defendant knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should have known, that some users would leave 
the power connected while unclogging.”35 
The second case was Bursch v. Beardsley & Piper. 36  The 
plaintiff, a foundry worker at the DeZurik foundry, was seriously 
injured while operating a core-making machine at the foundry when 
his right hand and forearm were crushed and burned as he attempted 
to align the parts of a core-box. 37  The accident was due to a 
combination of inadequate training of the employees who worked 
on the machine, failure of the key employees involved, including 
the plaintiff, to read the machine manual, or to follow the safety 
procedures in the manual.38 The plaintiff sued DeZurik, alleging 
that Beardsley negligently designed the machine and failed to 
provide adequate warnings.39 The jury found for the plaintiff on the 
negligent design theory and assigned 76 percent of the fault to 
DeZurik, 20 percent to Beardsley, and 4 percent to the plaintiff. 
Damages were set at $888,000.40 
Beardsley argued on appeal that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on superseding cause.41 
                                                 
33. Parks v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 289 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Minn. 1979). 
34. Id. at 459. 
35. Id. at 459. 
36. 971 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1992). 
37. Id. at 110.  
38. Id. at 110. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Minnesota’s pattern jury instruction on superseding cause reads as follows: 
Definition of “superseding cause” 
However, a cause is not a direct cause when there is a superseding cause. 
A cause is a superseding cause when four conditions are present: 
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The Eighth Circuit held that it was not error for the trial court to 
refuse to give that instruction because the evidence supported the 
conclusion that the intervening actions of the co-employees were 
foreseeable to the defendant.42 
                                                 
1. It happened after the original (negligence)(fault); and 
2. It did not happen because of the original (negligence)(fault); and 
3. It changed the natural course of events by making the result different 
from what it would have been; and 
4. The original wrongdoer could not have reasonably anticipated this 
event. 
4 MINN. PRAC., JURY INSTR. GUIDES--CIVIL CIVJIG 27.20 (6th ed. 2014). 
42. Bursch, 971 F.2d at 112–13. The court carefully evaluated the actions and 
inactions of DeZurik, Bursch, and Bursch’s co-employees in arriving at its 
conclusion: 
We find no abuse in the present case because the evidence presented 
at trial failed to support the conclusion that DeZurik’s negligence was 
not reasonably foreseeable. Regarding Bursch’s training, Beardsley & 
Piper could have foreseen that Dezurik would not give the manual to 
Bursch, Richter, or Burger. The manual was technical in nature and 
contained more information than an operator or foreman needed. 
Moreover, it was foreseeable that the person training Bursch might not 
be familiar with the manual either. Beardsley & Piper’s own expert 
admitted that it was common practice in the industry to have existing 
operators train new ones. 
As to machine maintenance, Beardsley & Piper reasonably could 
have foreseen that DeZurik would not maintain the machine in the strict 
manner recommended in the operating manual. The environment in a 
foundry is extremely abrasive and sand regularly accumulates on 
important parts of the core-making machine, including the blowplate. 
Beardsley & Piper’s expert acknowledged that some of the manual’s 
maintenance instructions—such as check every nut, bolt and screw, 
every day—were not to be taken literally and that even with proper 
maintenance, valves could still develop leaks. 
Beardsley & Piper further argues that even if DeZurik’s negligent 
training and maintenance were foreseeable, Richter’s failure to activate 
the correct valve was not, and, as such, was a superseding cause of at 
least part of Bursch’s injuries. According to Beardsley & Piper, this 
conclusion *113 necessarily flows from the jury’s finding in its favor on 
the Bursches’ failure to warn claim. We disagree. It certainly was 
foreseeable that another employee might attempt to rescue Bursch and it 
was also foreseeable that, in the confusion of the moment, the employee 
might accidentally activate the wrong valve regardless of how the 
controls were labeled. The jury’s finding on the failure to warn claim, 
therefore, does not alter the foreseeability of Richter’s mistake. 
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The majority also relied on Bilotta v. Kelley Co.,43 a case in 
which the plaintiff was severely injured when he was pinned at the 
neck against a doorjamb by a forklift truck that tipped over at a 
loading dock at the warehouse where he worked.44 The warehouse 
lessee, Safelite, chose between dock designs, rejecting a design with 
a safety device that would have prevented the injury that occurred 
when the dockboard shifted.45 One of the issues in the case was 
whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on 
superseding cause.46 The supreme court held that it did not.47 
As in Montemayor, there were OSHA violations by Safelite, but 
the court in Bilotta made two important points in rejecting the 
argument that those actions were unforeseeable.48 The first was that 
an intervening cause cannot be a superseding cause if the 
intervening conduct is foreseeable.49 The court initially established 
the broad proposition that “OSHA violations cannot be considered 
superseding causes which relieve a manufacturer of its duty to 
produce a safe product,” 50  but then apparently qualified that 
statement by noting that in the specific case the appellant’s quality 
control manager wrote an article stating that high employee 
turnover made it difficult to ensure that the necessary employee 
safety education was being accomplished.51 The court concluded 
that “[c]learly, OSHA violations in these circumstances were 
reasonably foreseeable and thus do not constitute [a] superseding 
cause. . . . ”52 
The second key point was that OSHA violations should not 
automatically supersede a manufacturer’s responsibility to design a 
safe product. Rather, OSHA violations “are adequately taken into 
consideration in the comparative-fault formula.”53 In fact, as the 
                                                 
43. 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984). 
44. Id. at 620.  
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 621. 
47. Id. 




52. Id. (citing Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Minn. 1980)). 
53. Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 604.01 1982)). 
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court noted, comparative responsibility was reflected in the jury’s 
verdict, which assigned 40 percent of the fault to Safelite.54 
The second point appears to return to the broader, less fact-
specific position on superseding cause. Comparative fault puts 
pressure on common law rules that result in all-or-nothing 
ameliorative determinations, some of which might work to the 
benefit of plaintiffs and some to defendants. The critical point is that 
given the application of comparative fault principles, it becomes 
less necessary to use superseding cause as an absolute bar when a 
third party’s negligence may be taken into consideration, along with 
the fault of the product manufacturer.55 
The majority in Montemayor saw several undisputed 
circumstances that established “that Sebright had, or should have 
had, some awareness of the risk of Montemayor’s injury.”56 They 
included the fact that Sebright knew that workers would sometimes 
enter the extruder to perform maintenance on the extruder, and that 
the manual instructions provided a means of unjamming the 
                                                 
54. Id. 
55. The Third Restatement takes the position that: 
Plaintiff’s negligence is defined by the applicable standard for a 
defendant’s negligence. Special ameliorative doctrines for defining 
plaintiff’s negligence are abolished.” As examples, the ameliorative 
doctrines that are abolished include last clear chance and avoidable 
consequences. The comments note that comparative fault may also 
affect what constitutes a superseding cause, although it acknowledges 
that the superseding cause issue is beyond the scope of the comparative 
fault Restatement. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3, cmt. c 
(Am. Law Inst. 2000) cmt. c. The Reporters’ Note explains: 
Rules of legal cause and scope of liability are beyond the scope of this 
Restatement. Nevertheless, comparative negligence may have an effect 
on those rules, especially when they are based on a judgment that the 
egregious culpability of an intervening cause relieves an earlier, less 
culpable actor from liability. This all-or-nothing approach is undermined 
by the premise of comparative responsibility: that the factfinder should 
compare on a sliding scale the responsibility of all actors who caused an 
injury. Rather than totally absolve an earlier cause under a rule about 
superseding causes, the factfinder could just adjust the percentages 
assigned to the parties. . . Thus, the underlying premise of comparative 
responsibility may affect those doctrines. Nevertheless, they are beyond 
the scope of this Restatement. 
Id. cmt. b, Reporters’ Note (citations omitted). 
56. Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 631. 
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extruder from the control panel.57 While the trial court found it 
unforeseeable that there would be simultaneous use of the two 
methods of unjamming the extruder, the majority noted that the 
machine was designed so the control panel could be relocated, but 
without instructions that it should be placed to permit operators to 
see the dangerous parts of the extruder.58 The court concluded that 
a reasonable person could find that Sebright should have foreseen 
the possibility that the extruder would be operated from the control 
panel while a worker was in the extruder.59 Finally, the court noted 
the disagreement among the experts on the foreseeability of the 
accident.60 
Because it was a “close case,”61 the majority held that it had to 
be resolved by the jury, rather than the court.62 In so holding the 
opinion rejected the dissent’s declaration that it was making “bad 
law”: 
[T]his result is consistent with our longstanding 
precedent . . . Moreover, a jury may ultimately find that 
Montemayor’s injury was not reasonably foreseeable, that Sebright 
was not negligent, or that others were. And manufacturers may still 
avoid the burden of going to trial when the evidence does not present 
a factual dispute or a “close case” for the factfinder to resolve. But 
this is a close case. Were we to end it, we would have to “weigh facts 
or determine the credibility of affidavits and other 
evidence.” . . . That role is properly reserved for the jury.63 
                                                 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 631–32. 
60. Id. at 633. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. The court specifically noted that it did not intend to alter the standards 
applicable to motions for summary judgment: 
We agree with the dissent that the “close cases” standard does not 
change our summary judgment standard for questions of foreseeability. 
It merely reinforces the notion that, in determining whether a dispute of 
material fact exists, all inferences arising from the evidence must be 
resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. . . In other words, a case is 
“close” not only when the evidence presents an explicit dispute of 
material fact, but also when “reasonable persons might draw different 
conclusions from the evidence.” 
Id. at 629 n. 3. 
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2.   THE DISSENT—THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Justice Gildea opened her dissenting opinion with this 
broadside: 
The circumstances of this case are both disturbing and tragic. But it 
is not reasonable, as a matter of law, common sense, or public policy, 
to expect a manufacturer to foresee—absent any admissible 
evidence—that the safety device it installed on the machine would 
be disabled and that an employer would violate multiple safety 
regulations in using the machine. As the district court said, “bad facts 
can lead to bad law.” The facts of this case are most certainly bad, 
and the majority has written bad law. Because the majority has 
written bad law, I respectfully dissent.64 
The dissent’s framework for analyzing the duty issue was 
roughly similar to the majority’s: 
• “‘[T]he duty to exercise reasonable care arises from the 
probability or foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff.’”65 
• “Whether a manufacturer owes a duty is ‘a question of law 
for the court—not one for jury resolution.’”66 
• The manufacturer’s duty is to design “‘a reasonably safe 
product.’”67 
• The manufacturer has a duty to warn if it is foreseeable “‘ to 
the manufacturer that the product would be used in a 
dangerous manner,’”68 but there is no duty to “‘warn of an 
improper use that could not have been foreseen.’” 69 
The dissent’s analysis of the controlling authority differed from 
the majority’s. The dissent took as its text the court’s opinion in 
                                                 
64. Id. at 633–34. 
65. Id. at 634 (quoting Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 26 (Minn. 2011)). 
66. Id. (quoting Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 
(Minn. 1986)). 
67. Id. (quoting Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 624 (Minn. 1984)). 
68. Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 467 (Minn. 
1998). 
69. Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 634. (quoting Frey v. Montgomery Ward & 
Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn. 1977)). 
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Huber v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works 70  in analyzing the 
foreseeability issue. In that case an employer was injured when his 
foot hit an unguarded foot switch on a punch press he was 
operating.71 The employer failed to comply with OSHA regulations 
in ensuring that the proper point of operation safety devices were 
operable on the foot switch.72 The dissent emphasized the court’s 
holding in that case that the manufacturer could not reasonably 
foresee that the employer would fail to comply with the OSHA 
regulations, and that as a consequence the manufacturer “had ‘no 
duty to insure the use of such safety devices’ and ‘no duty to warn 
about possible dangers of failing to provide proper point of 
operation safety mechanisms.’”73 
Applying Huber, the dissent concluded “that Sebright had no 
duty as a matter of law . . . because it was not reasonably 
foreseeable that VZ Hogs would fail to comply with OSHA 
regulations covering the safe operation of the extruder.”74 
Huber is a little more complicated than that, however. The 
plaintiff in that case, an employee of the R & M Manufacturing Co., 
suffered a serious injury to his hand while operating a punch press 
manufactured by Niagara Machine and Tool Works.75 The press 
was equipped with a foot pedal manufactured by Allen Bradley 
Co.76 The injury occurred when the plaintiff’s foot slipped and came 
down on the activating pedal while he was straightening a warped 
piece of metal in the press.77 The machine came with protective 
safety devices on all sides of the pedal, but sometime before the 
accident the front guard had been removed.78 The plaintiff had been 
warned not to operate the press with his hands in the die area.79 
There was a warning to the same effect on the machine.80 
                                                 
70. 430 N.W.2d 465 (Minn. 1988). 
71. Id. at 466. 
72. Id. at 467. 
73. Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 635–36 (quoting Huber v. Niagara Machine 
& Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn. 1998)). 
74. Id. at 636. 
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Huber brought suit against Niagara and Allen Bradley, alleging 
various theories, including negligent design of the press and foot 
switch and failure to warn of dangers associated with the machine.81 
The claim against Allen Bradley was reduced to failure to warn 
only. Allen Bradley moved for summary judgment on that theory. 
The trial court granted the motion.82 The court of appeals reversed.83 
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals.84 
The issue was whether a component manufacturer has a “duty 
to warn users of its product that safety devices permanently attached 
to the product should not be moved and that extra safety 
precautions—which are the responsibility of the user’s employer, 
not the component manufacturer.”85 
The majority distinguished Huber in a footnote, primarily 
because that case involved a manufacturer of a component part, 
noting that the case was carefully limited the those facts and that the 
court in Huber, stating that “‘[t]his reasoning does not conflict with 
our prior decisions establishing that the manufacturer of a finished 
product has a duty to warn ultimate users of dangers presented by 
its product and this duty may not be delegated to an 
intermediary.’”86 
In part two of its opinion the Montemayor dissent carefully 
sifted the evidence in concluding that there was an insufficient 
factual dispute to justify withholding summary judgment. The court 
found no factual disputes in the expert reports because the plaintiff’s 
report simply made a conclusory statement that Sebright should 
have been able to foresee VZ Hogs’ failure to train its employees.87 
The lack of a factual basis for the opinion, which was set out in a 
letter to the plaintiff’s attorney, was labeled inadmissible hearsay, 
leading the dissent to conclude that there was no evidence of 
foreseeability.88 
In summary, there is less of a disagreement about the controlling 
legal standards than the application of the standards to the specific 





85. Id. at 466-67. 
86. Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 631 n. 4 (quoting Huber, 430 N.W.2d at 468 
n.2). 
87. Id. at 637. 
88. Id. at 638–40. 
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facts of the case. That focuses more sharply the key dispute in the 
case, one in which both the majority and dissent carefully examined 
the evidence in determining whether there was a sufficient question 
to conclude that it was a “close case” that justified submission of 
the foreseeability issue to the jury. 
3.   CLOSE CASES 
In Doe v. Brandon,89 a 2014 decision involving the issue of 
whether a church district council should have foreseen the sexual 
misconduct of a volunteer minister when it renewed his credentials, 
the supreme court held that the trial court did not err in granting 
summary judgment to the district council. The issue was whether 
the minister’s conduct was foreseeable. 
In cases involving harm caused by a third person to the plaintiff, 
a defendant owes no duty to guard against that harm unless there is 
a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff (or 
between the defendant and the third person), or if the defendant 
creates a foreseeable risk of injury to the plaintiff.90 In an opinion 
written by Justice Lillehaug, the court in Doe resolved that issue in 
favor of the defendant, noting, in a footnote, that Minnesota case 
law states, without explanation, “that in close cases, foreseeability 
as it relates to duty is a jury question.”91 
As the court noted in Doe, the provenance of the “close cases” 
statement is unclear. The dissent in Montemayor pegs it to Lundgren 
v. Fultz, in 1984.92 In Senogles v. Carlson, decided a little over two 
months after Montemayor, Justice Lillehaug doubled down on the 
“close cases” language in concluding that the foreseeability issue is 
for the jury. 93  One of the issues in Senogles was whether a 
landowner should have foreseen the potential risk to his four-year-
old grandchild who nearly drowned while a visitor at a family party 
on property that abutted the Mississippi River.94 
                                                 
89. 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. 2014). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 178 n.2. 
92. 354 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1984). 
93. Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, at 43 (Minn. 2017). Justice Anderson 
emphasized in his dissent that this does not change the basic summary judgment 
standard. Id. at 49–51. 
94. Id. at 43. The court initially acknowledged that a landowner owes a duty of 
reasonable care to entrants on land, see Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 
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The defendant moved for summary judgment. The trial court 
granted the motion because the injury to the child was not 
foreseeable. The court of appeals affirmed, but on the grounds that 
the danger was obvious to a child.95 The supreme court reversed. 
The court first declined the defendant’s invitation “to adopt a 
categorical rule that the danger of swimming unattended in any 
Minnesota river, lake, or pool is necessarily obvious to all children, 
no matter how young and inexperienced.”96 Then, because there 
were disputed facts concerning the child’s experience and opposing 
inferences that could be drawn as to whether he appreciated the 
danger in returning to the river after having swum there earlier, the 
court held that the obviousness issue was for the trier of fact.97 
That left the issue of whether the injury was foreseeable to the 
defendant, even assuming that the danger presented by the water 
was obvious. The court noted the dissent’s argument98 that it was 
unforeseeable as a matter of law that the child would be unnoticed 
when he walked back to the river,99 but rejected it because “any 
parent of a mobile 4-year-old child will understand the proclivity of 
young children to wander off quickly to pursue whatever curiosity 
intrigues them,” and “the opportunity to wander existed because the 
children were playing in an unfenced area away from the adults.”100 
The court concluded that the facts and the reasonable inferences 
                                                 
(Minn. 1972), but then ramped the duty down, running it through the pinch point 
in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965), which focuses first on whether 
a danger is obvious to an entrant and second, if it is, whether injury to the entrant 
is foreseeable notwithstanding the obviousness. Id at 42. 
95. Senogles v. Carlson, No. A15–2039, 2016 WL 3659314, at *3 (Minn. Ct. 
App. July 11, 2016) (“We conclude that Carlson did not owe a duty to Shawn to 
protect him from the danger of the river because the danger of the river was open 
and obvious to Shawn”). 
96. Id. at 47. 
97. Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, at 48. The defendant urged the court 
to adopt “a new rule of law that a Minnesota landowner owes no duty of care to 
a child entrant if the child enters the land accompanied by a parent or guardian, 
no matter how foreseeable the harm.”  The court rejected the argument. Id. at 48. 
98. Id. at 52 (“Given the voluminous case law recognizing the obviousness of 
the danger of water, the risk of the Mississippi River was obvious to an 
objectively reasonable child of 4 years and 8 months”). 
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from them make the issue of foreseeability a close one to be decided 
by a jury.101 
Senogles becomes an important complement to Montemayor in 
determining the substance of the “close case” tag. If a “close case” 
determination is simply a proxy for a determination that there is an 
issue over which reasonable minds might differ, it does not change 
the basic approach to summary judgment motions based on a lack 
of foreseeability. 
The Montemayor dissent did not see it that way. The dissent’s 
perception is that the majority’s statement that summary judgment 
is inappropriate even when there is no explicit factual dispute, if 
reasonable minds could differ based on the inference to be drawn 
from those facts, is simply wrong.102 The essence of the criticism 
appears to be that the majority split what was a unitary standard into 
two separate elements. 
It is not clear that was the majority’s intent. It appears not so 
much to be suggesting a “new rule,” as a different way of viewing 
“old law” in summary judgment cases where the issue is 
foreseeability of harm. The key part of the majority opinion, the 
“new rule,” is its statement that even absent “an explicit factual 
dispute in the record,” the foreseeability issue still is for the jury 
because the case is a “close case” where “reasonable minds might 
differ” on that issue. Inferences are difficult to separate from the 
underlying facts that support them and, as the court has consistently 
recognized, the law does not favor one form of evidence over the 
other, nor should it when the question is whether reasonable minds 
can differ on an inference as opposed to the underlying facts that 
may or may not support the inference. That seems to be all the 
Montemayor majority is saying.103 Senogles reinforces that view. 
The Montemayor/Senogles “close case” view seems to require 
nothing more, but, very importantly, it also seems to require nothing 
                                                 
101. Id. at 48. 
102. Montemayor v. Sebright Products, Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623 at 640 and n.7. 
103 . The court’s reference to Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 
N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. 1978) appears to establish that the court is referring to 
the inferences that may be drawn from established facts. Montemayor v. Sebright 
Products, Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623 at 629. 
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less. A motion for summary judgment should not be a substitute for 
a trial.104 
The cases effectively push the summary judgment barometer to 
increase the pressure to find foreseeability a jury issue when either 
the direct facts and/or inferences to be drawn from those facts are in 
dispute, with Montemayor/Senogles providing rough factual 
guidelines for making that determination.105 
4.   SHOULD THE JURY BE INSTRUCTED ON FORESEEABILITY? 
In “close cases” the court has held that the foreseeability issue 
is for the jury, but it has not provided further guidance on the issue. 
A pair of 1969 Minnesota Supreme Court decisions written by 
Justice Rogosheske clearly state that a party requesting a jury 
instruction on foreseeability should be entitled to that instruction if 
it is timely made. 
In Lommen v. Adolphson & Peterson Construction Co.,106  a 
case involving an injury sustained by the plaintiff in a construction 
accident when he fell from scaffolding when a handhold the 
defendant’s employees had installed came loose. The jury found for 
the plaintiff and the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff. On 
appeal, the supreme court affirmed, rejecting the defendant that the 
injury was not foreseeable as a matter of law. The court also rejected 
the defendant’s argument that the jury should have been instructed 
on foreseeability. That claim was rejected because the defendant did 
not specifically request a foreseeability instruction and held that the 
trial court’s instruction to the jury based on the pattern jury 
instruction on negligence full and fairly stated the applicable law. 
The court also stated that under the circumstances of the case, “a 
trial court would have been well advised to grant it to aid the jury’s 
understanding of the defendant’s theory of the case.”107 
In Berry v. Haertel,108 a city employee went to the defendant’s 
store to buy hay for use on a city construction project. While there, 
he was injured when he fell through a wooden floor while obtaining 
                                                 
104. See C.O. v. Doe, 757 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Minn. 2008); Bixler v. J.C. Penney 
Co., 376 N.W.2d 209, 215 (Minn. 1985); Utecht v. Shopko Dep't Store, 324 
N.W.2d 652,653 (Minn. 1982); Olson v. Kozlowski, 311 N.W.2d 851, 852 (Minn. 
1981). 
105. See the Appendix. 
106. 168 N.W.2d 673 (Minn. 1969). 
107. Id. at 677. 
108. 170 N.W.2d 558 (Minn. 1969). 
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the hay. Following entry of judgment on a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff, the defendant appealed, arguing in part that the trial court 
should have instructed the jury on his theory of the case, which 
emphasized the foreseeability of the risk and his notice of a 
dangerous condition. The supreme court rejected the argument 
because the defendant did not specifically request the trial court to 
give that instruction. The court also stated that “the trial court might 
have been well advised to give such an instruction had defendant 
properly requested,” while also noting that the instruction given on 
the duty of a possessor of land to business invitees accurately stated 
the law.109 
Neither Berry nor Lommen involved specific requests by the 
defendants for a foreseeability instruction, but the court suggests 
that such an instruction would be appropriate if requested. If the 
foreseeability issue is the key to the case, and central to the defense, 
is there any reason why the jury should not be instructed on the 
issue? An instruction on foreseeability and a special verdict 
question on the issue could be decisive. If a jury found a particular 
risk to be foreseeable it would proceed to consider whether the 
defendant was negligent in creating that risk. If the jury found that 
the risk was not foreseeable that would be the end of the case. 
Montemayor/Senogles does not specifically state that there 
should be a jury instruction on foreseeability, but the court in 
Senogles does seem to indicate that foreseeability is a separate issue, 
perhaps antecedent to, the breach and proximate cause issues, when 
it stated its conclusion that the defendant was not precluded “from 
arguing to the jury that, because he understood that Shawn was to 
be supervised by others, [he] could not foresee the danger to 
Shawn, . . . was not negligent, or [that his actions] were not the 
proximate cause of Shawn’s injury.”110 Montemayor suggests the 
same, in noting that “a jury may ultimately find that Montemayor’s 
injury was not reasonably foreseeable, that Sebright was not 
negligent, or that others were.”111 
If a jury is instructed on foreseeability, the next issue is what 
standard should be applied to the issue. There are varying 
                                                 
109. Id. at 562. 
110. Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, at 48. 
111. 898 N.W.2d at 633. 
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formulations in the Minnesota cases.112 A standard that has recently 
gained currency113 is the formulation in Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford 
v. Yamaha Motor Corp., which states the standard as “whether the 
specific danger was objectively reasonable to expect, not simply 
whether it was within the realm of any conceivable possibility.”114 
The Civil Jury Instruction Guides suggests a more general 
standard, if there is to be an instruction on foreseeability. In 
brackets, to ensure that it will not be a rote instruction in a 
negligence case, it provides that: 
An injury is foreseeable if a reasonable person in the same or similar 
circumstances would have foreseen it. The exact way an injury 
occurred does not have to be foreseeable.115 
The correlative special verdict question, the first one in a 
negligence case, would ask whether the injury to the plaintiff was 
foreseeable to the defendant. An affirmative answer would prompt 
the jury to answer the breach of duty issue. 
Of course, in taking the position that foreseeability is a question 
for the jury, it could be that the court really means only that the 
breach issue, including foreseeability, is a jury issue. The pattern 
jury instruction on negligence says nothing about foreseeability, but 
nothing prevents argument on that issue, as noted in 
Montemayor/Senogles. 
5.   SHOULD FORESEEABILITY EVEN BE 
PART OF THE DUTY DETERMINATION? 
Courts often say that duty is a question of law for the court and 
because foreseeability of risk is a predicate, that question has to be 
first resolved by the courts to determine whether a duty exists. No 
foreseeability, no duty. But what happens if foreseeability is 
removed from the duty determination? 
                                                 
112 . See Mike Steenson, Minnesota Negligence Law and the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, 37 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1055 (2011). 
113. Id. at 1102. 
114. 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998). 
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Section 7 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm provides that “An actor ordinarily has 
a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates 
a risk of physical harm.”116 It removes foreseeability from the duty 
determination and places it squarely in the breach issue.117  The 
intent of section 7 in removing foreseeability from the duty 
determination is to clarify the role of courts and juries. 
Foreseeability is an essential part of the breach determination. The 
consequence is that courts may be more likely to defer to juries for 
resolution of the foreseeability issue, rather than effectively trying 
a case in order to decide whether an injury is foreseeable. 
There are categorical cases in which courts will hold that there 
is no duty. In products liability cases, for example, a court may hold 
as a matter of law that as a general proposition a prescription drug 
manufacturer’s duty is owed only to the prescribing physician and 
not to the general public.118  Or, as in Senogles, the court might 
reject a suggested categorical rule on duty, as it did in refusing to 
adopt “a rule that the danger of swimming unattended in any 
Minnesota river, lake, or pool is necessarily obvious to all children, 
no matter how young and inexperienced.”119 
According to the Restatement, a no duty determination is a 
purely legal question that liability should not be imposed on a 
                                                 
116 . RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (a) (Am. Law. Inst. 2010). Subpart (b) accounts for 
limitations on liability: “In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing 
principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of 
cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty 
of reasonable care requires modification.” Id. § 7(b). 
117. Section 3 provides that: 
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care 
under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining 
whether the person's conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable 
likelihood that the person's conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable 
severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm. 
Id. § 3. 
118. Id. at cmt. i. For two examples of courts adopting the Restatement and 
removing foreseeability from the duty determination, see Thompson v. 
Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009); A.W. v. Lancaster County Sch. Dist., 
784 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 2010). 
119. 902 N.W.2d 38 at 47. 
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certain category of potential defendants. The comments explain 
further: 
Such a ruling should be explained and justified based on articulated 
policies or principles that justify exempting these actors from 
liability or modifying the ordinary duty of reasonable care. These 
reasons of policy and principle do not depend on the foreseeability 
of harm based on the specific facts of a case. They should be 
articulated directly without obscuring references to foreseeability.120 
The Restatement points out that in “conducting its analysis, the 
court may take into account factors that might escape the jury’s 
attention in a particular case, such as the overall social impact of 
imposing a significant precautionary obligation on a class of 
actors.” 121  Foreseeability is not included. 122  Where “reasonable 
minds could differ about the competing risks and burdens or the 
foreseeability of the risks in a specific case . . . courts should not use 
duty and no-duty determinations to substitute their evaluation for 
that of the factfinder.”123 
There are cases where a court may conclude that there is no 
breach of duty as a matter of law, however. In those cases, however, 
it is clear that the determination is based on the specific facts of a 
case, rather than principle or policy. Those decisions lack the 
precedential value of categorical decisions on the duty issue, 
however, and should be understood as such. 
The dissents in Montemayor and Senogles almost seem to be 
doing that in concluding that the plaintiffs’ injuries were not 
foreseeable, but if that analysis is effectively a breach analysis, a 
question arises as to why the dissents’ interpretation of the facts and 
inferences drawn from those facts should trump the views of jurors 
on the issue. The dissents illustrate the reason why the Restatement 
eliminated foreseeability from the duty determination. 
Taking the position of the Restatement is not far removed from 
what the court effectively accomplished in Montemayor and 
Senogles, however, by a tightening in the application of summary 
judgment standards. 
                                                 
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7, cmt. i (2010). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at cmt. j. 
123. Id. 
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With Montemayor/Senogles, a “rule” effectively emerges 
stating not quite that an employer’s intervening actions can never 
be a superseding cause, but that it will be extremely difficult to 
establish that it is on a motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The closeness of the decisions in Montemayor and Senogles 
effectively highlights a difference not so much in the basic legal 
standards that apply in resolving motions for summary judgment 
that argue a particular injury is not foreseeable as it does in a 
difference in judicial attitudes toward the role of judge and jury in 
making that determination. Even if the legal standards are not 
altered in the cases, the summary judgment envelope has certainly 
been pushed to make it more likely that summary judgment will not 
be granted in these sorts of cases. 
In Foss v. Kincade,124 a 2009 decision, Justice Paul Anderson 
suggested that “in most cases the question of foreseeability is an 
issue for the jury.”125  That part of Foss was questioned by Justice 
G. Barry Anderson in Domagala v. Rolland,126 who also noted that 
close cases should be resolved by the jury, but also, citing Alholm 
v. Wilt,127 an innkeeper’s liability case, that foreseeability is more 
properly resolved by the court.128 
One might wonder whether the court has now effectively 
returned to the court’s observation in Foss. 
 
  
                                                 
124. 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009). 
125. Id. at 322–23. 
126. 805 N.W.2d 14, 27 n.3 (Minn. 2011). 
127. 394 N.W.2d 488, 491 n.5 (Minn. 1986). 
128. Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 37 n.3. 
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APPENDIX   
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT METER 
Any number of cases could be placed on the summary judgment 
meter. The closer the facts of the case to Montemayor, the more 
likely that summary judgment on the basis of foreseeability will be 
denied. The closer to Huber, the more likely the motion will be 
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